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Abstract
Although there are a large number of papers on
secure routing in mobile ad-hoc networks, only a few
consider the anonymity issue. In this paper, we define
more strict requirements on the anonymity and security
properties of the routing protocol, and notice that previous
research works only provide Weak Location Privacy and
Route Anonymity, and are vulnerable to specific attacks.
Therefore, we propose the Anonymous Secure Routing
(ASR) protocol that can provide additional properties on
anonymity, i.e. Identity Anonymity and Strong Location
Privacy, and at the same time ensure the security of
discovered routes against various passive and active
attacks. Detailed analysis shows that, ASR can achieve
both anonymity and security properties, as defined in the
requirements, of the routing protocol in mobile ad-hoc
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to the wired networks, mobile ad-hoc net-
works are much more vulnerable to security attacks. This
is mainly due to its features of open medium, dynamic
topology, cooperative algorithms, lack of centralized mon-
itoring and management point. Current research works
on securing mobile ad-hoc networks mainly focus on
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, and
fairness, and there are only a few papers [9], [3] consid-
ering the anonymity issue. However, anonymity should be
one important part of the overall solution for truly secure
mobile ad-hoc networks, especially in certain privacy-vital
environments. For example, in a battle field, we not only
want to ensure that adversaries cannot disclose the content
of our communications (i.e., confidentiality) or disable
the communications (i.e., availability and integrity), but
also expect that the identities and location information of
parties in communications are anonymous to adversaries.
Otherwise, adversaries may deduce important information
about the location or mobility model of communication
parties, which can be used to locate the target of their
physical attacks at a later time.
In previous works [9], [3], the definition of anonymity
is somehow loose. In other words, anonymity achieved
in [9], [3] is insufficient. In [9], the identity of the
destination is disclosed to nodes en route. In contrast,
in [3], the identities of the source and destination nodes
are anonymous to other nodes, but the identities of nodes
en route are open to the destination node. Therefore, two
cooperative adversaries can easily collect identities of other
nodes, and even know the relative locations of these nodes.
It is certainly undesirable in the real world. In addition, in
both [9] and [3], nodes en route have the knowledge about
how far, i.e. the number of hops, they are from the source.
In particular, when adversaries know that the source is
just one hop away, they can locate the source node using
directed antenna.
On the other hand, to be usable, the anonymous routing
protocol to be designed should be robust under various
attacks from adversaries. However, we notice that previ-
ous works [9], [3] are vulnerable to specific attacks. In
addition, due to some inherent limitations resulting from
anonymity-related requirements, we argue that solutions
in current secure routing protocols [18], [21], [11], [5],
[4] cannot be employed directly in anonymous routing
protocols. That is to say, while designing anonymous
routing protocols, we should keep both the anonymity and
security requirements in mind at the same time, instead of
patching security-related solutions at a later time.
In this paper, we first define more strict requirements
on the anonymity and security properties of the routing
protocol in mobile ad-hoc networks. Following that, we
propose the Anonymous Secure Routing (ASR) protocol
that can not only protect the privacy of nodes and routes,
but also ensure the security of discovered routes. After-
wards, detailed analysis is given to show that ASR can
ensure anonymity and security of the routing protocol
against known passive and active attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II and Section III, we define the goals and assumptions
of our works. The details of our protocol are presented
in Section IV. Following that, in Section V, we classify
attacks towards anonymous routing protocols, and analyze
the anonymity and security properties achieved in ASR.
In Section VI, we present the related work. Finally, in
Section VII, we draw the conclusion.
II. DESIGN GOALS
We intend to design a routing protocol which can
protect the privacy of nodes and routes, and at the same
time ensure the security of discovered routes. We define
the expected goals or properties that we want to achieve
in ASR as follows:
A. Ensure Privacy
1) Identity Privacy: Identity Privacy consists of the fol-
lowing requirements: (a) no one knows the real identities
of the source and the destination, except themselves; (b)
the source and the destination have no information about
the real identities of intermediate nodes en route.
2) Location Privacy: Location Privacy consists of the
following requirements: (a) no one knows the exact loca-
tion of the source or the destination, except themselves; (b)
other nodes, typically intermediate nodes en route, have no
information about their distance, i.e. the number of hops,
from either the source or the destination. This requirement
is optional, but it is desirable in keeping both identity
and location anonymity of the source or the destination,
especially when the distance is just one hop.
For a protocol satisfying (a), we say that such protocol
provides Weak Location Privacy; for a protocol satisfying
both (a) and (b), we say that such protocol provides Strong
Location Privacy.
3) Route Anonymity: Route Anonymity consists of the
following requirements: (a) adversaries, either en route or
out of the route, cannot trace a packet flow back to its
source or destination; (b) for adversaries not in the route,
they have no information on any part of the route; (c) it
is difficult for adversaries to infer the transmission pattern
and motion pattern of the source or the destination;
B. Ensure Security
The protocol can protect the necessary functionalities,
such as discover and maintain the route, from various types
of attacks.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper, we assume that (1) there is a shared secret
between the source and destination; (2) wireless links are
symmetric. Namely, if node A is in transmission range
of some node B , then B is in transmission range of A
as well; (3) adversaries have unbounded eavesdropping
capability but bounded computing and node intrusion
capabilities.
IV. ANONYMOUS SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the details of ASR. The
whole protocol consists of the following parts: Route
Request, Route Response, Anonymous Data Transmission,
and Route Maintenance.
As showed in Figure 1, we denote the source node,
nodes en route, and the destination node as S, X i (i =
1, 2, . . . , n), and D, respectively. n denotes the number of
nodes between the source and the destination.
S X1 Xi Xn D
Fig. 1. The Route from Source S to Destination D
A. Route Request
During the route request process, each node en route
denoted as Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) receives a route request
with the following format:[
RREQ, seq, KT (dest,Ks, U0), Ks(seq, END),
PKi−1, Ui−1
]
,
where
seq — the sequence number of the current session
KT — the secret shared between the source and
destination
dest — the identity of the destination D
Ks — the session key of the current session
END — a sign that the destination has received the
route request
PKi−1 — the public key of the one-time key pair
generated by the previous node X i−1. PK0 is
the one-time public key chosen by the source S.
U0 — a random number chosen by the source S
Ui−1 — a number computed by Xi−1.
For Ui (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) in RREQ, Xi computes it
according to Equation (1):
Ui = f(Ui−1, Si) = (Ui−1 ⊕ Si) px, (1)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Si is a random number chosen
by Xi with size px. U0 is a random number chosen by the
source S with size ps. Note that, in Equation (1), ⊕ means
the operation that Si, the length of which is px, XORs with
the least px bits of Ui−1. Thus, the computation denoted by
Equation (1) includes two steps. The output of the first step
is a number with size ps. The least px bits of the output
is the result that Si XORs with the least px bits of Ui−1,
while the higher bits are the same as the corresponding
bits of Ui−1. The next step is to right shift the result of
the first step for px bits.
Let Hmax denote the maximum number of hops that S
wish the route to be. Then, we have:
ps = (Hmax + 1) · px (2)
For instance, given that the length of the random
number chosen by Xi, i.e. Si, is 16, the source wants
to discover a route between the destination and itself, and
expects the length of the route is no more than 10 hops
(i.e. Hmax = 10). According to Equation (2), we know
that px = 176, and thus generate a random number U0
with 176 bits during the generation of the route request
message.
Once receiving the RREQ packet, each forwarding node
denoted as Xi first checks whether seq has been recorded
in its route table. If yes, it simply discards the packet
without decrypting the third element of the RREQ packet.
Otherwise, Xi tries to decrypt KT (dest,Ks, U0). If fails,
Xi records the seq, PKi−1, and Ks(seq, END) into the
local route table, generates Ui as shown in Equation (1),
and then replaces PKi−1 and Ui−1 with PKi and Ui,
respectively. Finally, Xi broadcasts the modified packet
locally.
If succeeds, it means that Xi is the destination node
of this packet, since only the destination can successfully
decrypt the packet. Afterwards, D compares U0, which
is recovered from the third element of the RREQ packet,
with Un to recover the length of the route, if the length is
equal to or less than Hmax. The destination discards those
packets whose Un has been modified by more than Hmax
nodes (i.e., the discovered route is longer thanHmax hops).
Thereafter, D generates and broadcasts a RREP packet for
each route with less than Hmax hops.
At the end of the route request process, each node en
route has the public key of the previous node, and the
destination has knowledge about the length of each route
found between S and D, whose length is equal to or less
than Hmax.
B. Route Response
During the route response process, each node en route
denoted as Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) receives a route response
with the following format:
[
RREP, {Ti+1}PKi , Ti+1(seq,K ′s)
]
where
K ′s — the proof that the destination has recovered
the secret from the third element of the RREQ
packet
Ti+1 — a random number chosen by X i+1, which is
used as the shared secret between Xi and Xi+1
after the routing discovery process.
Once receiving the RREP packet, each forwarding node
denoted as Xi first tries to decrypt {Ti+1}PKi , and re-
covers the last element of the RREP packet. Since the
second element is encrypted by PKi, only Xi can decrypt
it. Then Xi extracts seq from the recovered information,
and checks whether seq has been recorded in its route
table. If no, it simply discards the packet without any
furtherer checking. Otherwise, Xi extracts K ′s from the
recovered information. Thereafter, X i also needs to make
sure that the RREP packet is from the destination. It can
be verified by Equation (3), because only the destination
D can recover Ks from the RREQ packet. If Equation (3)
is not satified, Xi simply discards this RREP packet.
K ′s(seq, END)
?= Ks(seq, END), (3)
After successfully verifying the validity of the RREP
packet, Xi chooses a random number Ti, and adds Ti
and Ti+1 into the record with the corresponding seq. Then
computes {Ti}PKi−1 and Ti(seq,K ′s), which are used to
replace the last two elements of the RREP packet. Finally,
Xi broadcasts the modified RREP packet locally.
At the end of the route response process, each forward-
ing node has established shared secrets with the previous
and next nodes. The format of a record in the route table
of Xi is shown as follows:
seq PKi−1 Ti Ti+1
160 bits 160 bits 128 bits 128 bits
C. Anonymous Data Transmission
To realize anonymous data transmission, we need to
make sure that adversaries are not able to read or deduce
information about the source and destination from data
packets, and such information is only open to entities
holding corresponding secrets. It is definitely not a good
idea to encrypt the whole data packet using the shared
secrets, although this solution is workable in theory; oth-
erwise, each node has to try to decrypt the whole content of
every packet received before decides to accept or discard
it. Consequently, this method results in a great amount of
computational costs.
In ASR, we provide a solution by making use of the
shared secrets between any two consecutive nodes (i.e. T i).
Our idea is to construct some small-size information which
is sent together with the data packet so that a forwarding
node only needs to verify a small size information instead
of the whole packet. It is similar to the construction of
route pseudonym in [9], but is more simple and efficient.
The small size information denoted as TAG is constructed
as follows.
Given that, node Xi and node Xi+1 shares a secret
denoted as Ti+1. Let HK() be a keyed fast one-way
function, which use K as the key. The format of TAG
on the packet from Xi to Xi+1, denoted as TAGi, is
calculated as [N, HTi+1(N)], where N is a non-decrease
number chosen by Xi and is increased per packet received
or sent in this route.
The data transmission process is similar to the route
discovery process. Any forwarding node broadcasts the
data packet to its neighbors, and then neighbors verify
the validity of TAG. If the packet passes the verification,
the forwarding node re-calculates and replaces TAG. In
addition, before broadcasting the packet to its neighbors,
the content of data packets should shuffled by an efficient
encryption so that the adversaries cannot match payload
contents to trace data forwarding. If the packet fails to pass
the verification, it is discarded. Such process is repeated
until the packet reaches the destination.
D. Route Maintenance
We assume that, nodes can detect route failures when
re-transmission count exceeds a predefined number. Upon
detection, a node looks up the corresponding entry in its
forwarding table, finds the TAG information that it shares
with the previous node, and assembles a route error packet
of the format: [RERR, TAG].
V. ANONYMITY & SECURITY ANALYSIS
Firstly, we need to make clear that the Security term
discussed in this section does not include issues about
security of the content of data packets being transmitted. It
is easy to see that security of the content of data packets is
orthogonal to anonymity and security of the route protocol.
A. Passive Attacks & Active Attacks
Attacks against anonymous and secure routing in ad hoc
networks can be classified into two types:
• Passive Attacks typically involve unauthorized “lis-
tening” to the routing packets or silently refusing to
execute the function requested. The former type of
attacks might be an attempt to gain routing informa-
tion from which the attacker could extrapolate data
about the positions of each node in relation to the
others. Such an attack is usually impossible to detect,
since the attacker does not disrupt the operation
of a routing protocol but only attempts to discover
valuable information by listening to the routed traffic.
• Active Attacks are meant to degrade or prevent mes-
sage flow between the nodes. They can cause a degra-
dation or complete halt in communications between
nodes. Normally, such an attack involves actions per-
formed by adversaries, for instance, the replication,
modification, and deletion of exchanged data.
Typically, adversaries may launch both passive and ac-
tive attacks at the same time, and the information obtained
from the former can be used to enhance the effectiveness
of the latter. For example, adversaries may sniff broadcast
data and record specific signs that are used to identify
the route, and then launch Denial of Service (DOS) or
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks by sending
or broadcasting fake data using recorded signs.
For the anonymity and security analysis in this section,
we consider attacks from both internal nodes (i.e. in the
route) and external nodes (i.e. out of the route).
B. Anonymity Analysis
Here, we want to check whether ASR has achieved
anonymity-related goals defined in Section II, namely
Identity Privacy, Location Privacy, and Route Anonymity.
In the context of anonymity analysis, we assume that
all the nodes including nodes on the discovered route
are potential adversaries and are interested in the privacy
information about the two communication parties and
discovered routes.
1) Identity Privacy: In ASR, there is no node identity
involved except the destination’s identity, namely dest, in
the RREQ packet. Fortunately, dest is encrypted by the
shared secret between the source and the destination, and
thus it is known only to the two communication parties.
Therefore, ASR can ensure Identity Privacy in mobile ad-
hoc networks.
2) Location Privacy: The idea of current attacks on
Location Privacy is to overhear the route request and
route response packets and then deduce the distance from
the source or the destination by checking the length of
those packets. In [3], each forwarding node appends fixed-
length information, including the id of the node and a
session key (shared encryption key generated by the node),
etc., to the route request packet. Therefore, every node
receiving the route request packet can deduce the distance
between the source and itself. In [9], authors propose to
add random padding to the packets to prevent such attack.
This method works well, when adversaries are not in the
route. However, in order to calculate and replace the onion 1
in the route request and route response packets, internal
nodes (nodes en route) need to have full knowledge about
the actual size of the onion received. Consequently, their
work is still vulnerable to internal nodes. In ASR, the
length of the meaningful content of the route request and
route response does not increase along the route. As a
result of it, both external and internal nodes cannot deduce
how far they are from the source or the destination.
3) Route Anonymity: Current attacks on Route
Anonymity are based on Traffic Analysis [15]. The theory
behind all these attacks is to detect common information
among sniffed packets, and assume that any two packets
are transferred along the same route, if they have infor-
mation in common. The “common information” could be
either identical content (e.g., the same sequence number)
in sniffed packets, or identical time consumed by handling
sniffed packets, or certain pattern of variations (e.g., the
increase of the length of the packets). In ASR, hop-by-
hop payload shuffle is employed to prevent adversaries
from matching the content of packets. The second case
is also referred as Time Analysis. In timing analysis, the
adversary can use temporal dependency between transmis-
sions to trace a victim message’s forwarding path. One
usual method to thwart timing analysis is to use mixing
technique [14], [8], [2]. More specifically, we can use a
buffer to store and reshuffle the sequence of received data
packets, and at the same time inject dummy packets into
the buffer if necessary. As to the third case, we ensure
that the length of packets does not change during the
transmission, since the increase of the packet length could
be one signal for route tracing.
Table I shows the comparison of the anonymity-related
properties achieved in known anonymous routing proto-
cols in mobile ad-hoc networks. In the table, SDDR
and ANODR stand for the anonymous routing protocols
proposed in [3] and [9], respectively.
C. Security Analysis
1) Passive Attacks: The most simple attack on the
route protocol is that adversaries or selfish nodes silently
refuse to perform functions requested in the protocol.
In normal routing protocols, the watchdog model [10]
can be employed to detect such actions. However, in
anonymous routing, the route response is modified hop-
by-hop and is supposed to be undistinguishable from other
route responses. Therefore, by nature, we can not figure
out which route a given sniffed route response belongs
to, since it is a trade-off between anonymity and security.
The only usable solution is to discover and maintain a few
routes at the stage of route discovery.
1Onion is a cryptographic data structure which is firstly proposed in
[16].
SDDR ANODR ASR
Identity Privacy of The Source
and The Destination
√
X
√
Identity Privacy of Forwarding
Nodes en Route
X
√ √
Weak Location Privacy
√ √ √
Strong Location Privacy
(external nodes)
X
√ √
Strong Location Privacy
(internal nodes)
X X
√
Route Anonymity X
√ √
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE ANONYMITY PROPERTY OF ROUTING
PROTOCOLS
2) DoS Attacks: According to the target of the attack,
DoS attacks in the context of anonymous routing can
be classified into two types: Multiple-to-One attacks and
One-to-Multiple attacks. In the former attacks, multiple
adversaries (or one adversary with strong power) may
cooperate to exhaust the resource of a given target. The
first step of such attacks is to identify the target. Our
protocol is immune to this type of attacks, since Identity
Privacy is ensured in ASR. As to the latter attacks, one
adversary can send fake route request or route response
packets which exhaust the computation resources of all
consequent nodes along the route, since those nodes would
perform the cryptographic computation as requested in the
protocol. In ASR, such attacks are prevented by (a) little
computation, i.e., a symmetric key decryption to check
whether the node is the expected destination, is involved
in handling the RREQ packet; (b) employ hop-by-hop
authentication on the RREP packet. In [3], the computation
involved in handling the route request is much higher than
that of [9], which is slightly higher than the computation
taken in ASR due to the calculation of the onion.
3) Attacks on Route Maintenance: One possible attack
is that adversaries send fake route error packet to fool the
source to choose another route or even re-launch the route
discovery process. It makes no sense when adversaries en
route launch such an attack. Therefore, in the context of
attacks on route maintenance, we only consider adversaries
which are not in the route. In [3], there is no shared
secret between consecutive nodes en route, and thus a node
detecting route failures has difficulties in informing the
source such failures. In ASR, no adversary out of the route
can construct fake route error packets, because it does not
hold any secret with any node en route, which is necessary
to generate TAG in the RERR packet.
4) Wormhole Attacks: In Wormhole Attacks [6], an
attacker records packets received at one location in the
network, tunnels them to another location, and retrans-
mits them into the network. Hu, Perrig, and Johnson
propose an approach to detect wormhole attacks based
SDDR ANODR ASR
Passive Attacks
√ √ √
Multiple-to-One DoS Attacks X X
√
One-to-Multiple DoS Attacks X
√ √
Attacks on Route Maintenance X
√ √
Wormhole Attacks
√ √ √
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY PROPERTY OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS
on packet leashes [6]. The key intuition is that by au-
thenticating either an extremely precise timestamp (i.e.,
temporal leashes) or location information combined with
a loose timestamp (i.e., geographical leashes), a receiver
can determine if the packet has traversed a distance that
is unrealistic for the specific network technology used.
Both of the solutions can be easily integrated into ASR
without any conflict. In fact, ASR can provide a simple
method to detect wormhole attacks. As mentioned in
Section IV, in ASR, the destination knows the length of
each route, as long as the length does not exceed Hmax.
Therefore, a verification mechanism can be employed to
detect anomalies when comparing the metric (e.g. numbers
of hops).
Table II shows the comparison of the security-related
properties achieved in known anonymous routing proto-
cols in mobile ad-hoc networks. In the table, SDDR
and ANODR stand for the anonymous routing protocols
proposed in [3] and [9], respectively.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy and Anonymity on the Internet
Previous research works on privacy and anonymity on
the Internet concentrate on two issues: user anonymity
and anonymous communication. User anonymity aims at
providing the users anonymity while they are using the
network by letting them hide their identity from the com-
municating peers. Research on anonymous communication
focuses on providing a communication channel that is
immune to traffic analysis so that the communicating
parties can be anonymous against the eavesdroppers.
Anonymizer [1] is a user anonymity solution, which
prevents online tracking by blocking the real IP address.
Users can enjoy anonymity by rerouting their HTTP pack-
ets through the Anonymizer, which replaces the informa-
tion in the packet headers so that the websites cannot
infer the users’ identities. This approach has the problem
of a centralized trusted entity. The Anonymizer site can
track all the anonymous user activities and is also a single
point of failure. In [17], Reiter and Rubin introduce a
system called Crowds for protecting users’ anonymity on
the Internet. It is based on the idea of “blending into a
crowd,” i.e., hiding one’s actions within the actions of
many others. Upon receiving one request, each member of
Crowds can either submit the request directly to the end
server or forward it to another random chosen member.
When the request is eventually submitted, it is submitted
by a random member, thus preventing the end server from
identifying its true initiator.
One of the approaches on anonymous communication
is Onion Routing [16]. Such approach requires a set of
onion routers, and anonymous connections through the net-
work are multiplexed over longstanding socket connections
among onion routers. One advantage of this approach is
that, each onion router can only identify the previous and
next hop along a route, and data cannot be tracked en
route. However, the sequence of onion routers in a route
is strictly defined at connection setup. An onion proxy
takes charge of the task of defining the route. Therefore, if
the onion proxy is compromised, the anonymous property
of routes is compromised at the same time. Besides that,
the assumption of the existence of such an onion proxy is
unsuitable for purely ad-hoc networks.
In [19], [20], Shields and Levine present a protocol,
Hordes, for providing anonymous communication on the
Internet. Hordes employs multiple proxies similar to those
used in Crowds [17] to anonymously route a packet
towards the responder, but then uses multicast services to
anonymously route the reply to the initiator.
B. Anonymous Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc Networks
In [3], authors proposed a secure dynamic distributed
routing algorithm (denoted as SDDR in this paper) for
ad hoc wireless networks, which is based on the onion
routing protocol [16]. The anonymity-related properties
achieved in this algorithm include Weak Location Privacy
and Route Anonymity. However, it ignores one important
part of privacy in mobile ad-hoc networks, namely, Identity
Anonymity, and cannot provide Strong Location Privacy.
In [9], Kong et al. design ANonymous On De-
mand Routing (ANODR). Similar to Hordes, ANODR
[9] also explores multicast/broadcast to improve recipient
anonymity. However, ANODR is an on-demand protocol,
and it extensively explores trapdoor information in broad-
cast. These features are not discussed in Hordes’ multicast
mechanisms. Compared to [3], Kong et al. give a more
comprehensive analysis on the anonymity and security
properties achieved, and provide detailed simulation results
on the efficiency of ANODR. In addition, ANODR is more
efficient than SDDR at the data transmission stage. Similar
to [3], Identity Anonymity and Strong Location Privacy are
not provided in ANODR.
C. Secure Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc Networks
One hot area of securing mobile ad-hoc networks is
secure routing. Many solutions, such as ARAN [18],
AODV-S [21], SRP [11], Ariadne [5], SEAD [4], have been
proposed for protecting popular routing protocols, such
as AODV [13], DSR [7], and DSDV [12], from various
passive and active attacks. However, due to some inherent
limitations resulting from anonymity-related requirements,
those solutions cannot be employed directly in anonymous
routing protocols. For example, in [18], forwarding nodes
need to verify route request and route response packets
with the source’s and the destination’s certificates. This
conflicts with the goal of protecting the anonymity of the
two communication parties in anonymous routing proto-
cols.
VII. CONCLUSION
Anonymity is a very important part of the overall
solution for securing mobile ad-hoc networks. In this
paper, we first gave a comprehensive definition on the
goals that should be supported in anonymous routing
protocols. To achieve them, we proposed the Anonymous
Routing Protocol, which ensure both the anonymity and
security of the routing protocol. We also gave a detailed
analysis on how anonymity and security is achieved in our
protocol, and at the same time showed advantages of our
protocol, compared to previous works. Our future work
will aim at improving the efficiency of ASR in the terms
of route changes. One possible extension is to provide
the functionality of repairing broken routes locally without
compromising anonymity and security.
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